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FROM JUDGE TO JUSTICE: SOCIAL
BACKGROUND THEORY AND THE SUPREME
COURT
TRACEY E. GEORGE*
The Roberts Court Justices already have revealed many
differences from one another, but they also share a (possibly)
significant commonality: Presidents promoted all of them to the
U.S. Supreme Court from the U.S. Courts of Appeals. This
means, of course, that they initially learned how to be judges
while serving on a circuit court. How might the Justices'
common route to the Court affect their actions on it? Social
background theory hypothesizes that prior experience influences
subsequent behavior such as voting, opinion writing, and
coalition formation. This Article empirically analyzes
promotion to the Supreme Court and examines the implications
of promotion in light of the social background theory.
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INTRODUCTION
The Roberts Court after its first full Term appears to be deeply
divided and ideologically polarized.1 Prominent Supreme Court
* FedEx Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law School. Thanks to Michael Gerhardt and
the North Carolina Law Review staff for an outstanding Symposium. I benefited from the
ideas of Lisa Baldez, Ellinor Coder, Frank Cross, Lee Epstein, Barry Friedman, Linda
Greenhouse, Chris Guthrie, Pam Karlan, and Jeff Segal.
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reporters were unanimous in declaring that the nine Justices were as
conflicted as any Court in history. For example, a Washington Post
headline declared, "A Rightward Turn and Dissension Define [the]
Court."2  The first full Term was "marked by deep ideological
divisions and heated rhetoric."'3 "[W]arring factions"4 on the Court
battled over some of the most hotly contested issues in American
society, including abortion,5 capital punishment,6 race,7 and free
speech.8 Even Justices who agreed on outcomes sharply disagreed in
1. See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Roberts Steers Court Right Back to Reagan, USA TODAY,
June 28, 2007, at 8A (describing the Roberts Court first full Term as "remarkable"
because a "narrow majority of Justices changed the law" on highly political issues); Linda
Greenhouse, In Steps Big and Small, Supreme Court Moved Right, N.Y. TIMES, July 1,
2007, at Al (offering a detailed examination of the major cases decided in the October
2006 Term and concluding "the picture was clear. This was a more conservative court"
that decided one-third of its cases by a vote of five to four and nearly all of those were
"along ideological lines.").
2. Robert Barnes, A Rightward Turn and Dissension Define Court This Term,
WASH. POST, July 1, 2007, at A7 (reviewing several highly visible and closely decided
cases of the October 2006 Term to consider how the Court has turned to the right under
Roberts).
3. Joan Biskupic, School Diversity Programs in Doubt, USA TODAY, June 29, 2007,
at Al (detailing the Court's five-to-four decision rejecting school district's consideration of
race when making assignments to special programs).
4. David Von Drehle, Inside the Incredibly Shrinking Role of the Supreme Court,
TIME, Oct. 22, 2007, at 40, 43.
5. See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. , 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007). The Carhart
majority-Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito-voted
to uphold the Partial-Birth Abortion Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (Supp. III 2003), despite a 2000
decision striking a similar law as unconstitutional. Scalia and Thomas would have gone
further and overruled Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See Gonzales, 550 U.S. at __, 127
S. Ct. at 1639 (Thomas, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg, writing for the dissenters,
argued that "a decision so at odds with our jurisprudence should not have staying power."
Id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 1653 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2842 (2007). Justices Stevens,
Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer held that a prisoner was incompetent and thus
could not be executed where he lacked a "rational understanding" of the "meaning and
purpose" of his death sentence. Id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2862.
7. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. _, 127 S.
Ct. 2738 (2007). Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito
struck the challenged school district integration plans as unconstitutional. See id. at -,
127 S. Ct. at 2767-68. Four majority Justices-Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito-also
would have limited sharply the power of school districts to consider race when assigning
students to schools. See id. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). Justice Breyer, in a long and passionate dissent joined by
Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg, warned that "[this is a decision that the Court and the
Nation will come to regret." See id. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2837 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
8. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). Chief Justice
Roberts and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito granted schools greater
authority to censor student speech in a case known by the words on the offending banner:
"BONG HiTS 4 JESUS."
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some instances over the methods for achieving those outcomes, as
reflected in concurring opinions filed in several close cases.9
The Roberts Court Justices may have salient differences, but
they also have a potentially significant commonality: they are all in
their current position in part because they were sitting on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals at the time of an opening on the Supreme Court. 0
Presidents promoted them directly from the circuit courts, making
this the first time that all Justices have prior federal judicial
experience.1' Perhaps more significantly, they all gained that
experience on the courts immediately below the Supreme Court.
What are the implications of a Court composed of Justices who
learned how to be judges while serving on the intermediate appellate
courts? Prior judicial experience could affect the Justices in
numerous ways. For example, every Roberts Court Justice has
experience serving on a multi-member court where cooperation and
compromise are necessary to reach decisions. Does this mean that
the Justices on this Court, in contrast to their predecessors, are
relatively more inclined toward agreement and therefore produce
more moderate and measured decisions?
Or consider another example: every Roberts Court Justice came
to the Court after having had the experience of reversing judicial
decisions reached by lower court judges. Does this prior experience
9. Greenhouse, supra note 1; see, e.g., FEC v. Wis. Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. -, _,
127 S. Ct. 2652, 2683 n.7 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment) (decrying the Roberts's plurality opinion as "faux judicial restraint" that
amounts to "judicial obfuscation"); Hein v. Freedom from Religion Found., Inc., 557 U.S.
.... 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2573-74 (2007) (Justice Alito's opinion for the Court was joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy, who wrote a separate concurrence. Justices
Scalia and Thomas agreed with the plurality's conclusion that the taxpayers lacked
standing to challenge the White House's faith-based initiatives, but they would have gone
further and overturned Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), which granted limited standing
rights to taxpayers.); Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at -, 127 S. Ct. at 2791 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (criticizing Chief Justice Roberts's
plurality opinion's "all-too-unyielding insistence that race cannot be a factor in instances
when, in my view, it may be taken into account"); see also Tom Levinson, Scalia Courts
Conflict: 'Fundamentalist' Justice Goads Roberts To Be Bold-from His Own Safe Spot,
CHI. TRIB., Oct. 14, 2007, § 2, at 3 (describing how Justice Scalia has disagreed with Chief
Justice Roberts's logic despite agreeing in the outcome).
10. The Justices, in order of seniority, and their respective judicial appointments are
John Roberts (D.C. Circuit), John Paul Stevens (Seventh Circuit), Antonin Scalia (D.C.
Circuit), Anthony Kennedy (Ninth Circuit), David Souter (Superior Court of New
Hampshire, Supreme Court of New Hampshire, and First Circuit), Clarence Thomas
(D.C. Circuit), Ruth Bader Ginsburg (D.C. Circuit), Stephen Breyer (First Circuit), and
Samuel Alito (Third Circuit). See infra Appendix.
11. See sources cited infra note 15; see also infra text accompanying Figure 1 (setting
forth data on prior judicial experience of Supreme Court Justices); infra Appendix.
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mean that these Justices, in comparison to their predecessors, are
more likely to: (1) grant certiorari to cases they are likely to reverse,
and (2) reverse at a higher rate?
Finally, and most significantly in light of this Symposium on
Precedent and the Roberts Court, lower court judges are accustomed
to deferring to Supreme Court precedent. Does this deeply
engrained attitude survive when they are elevated to the Supreme
Court? Or is respect for precedent conditioned on position in the
judicial hierarchy such that former circuit judges no longer feel
constrained by prior Court rulings once they are on the Court? Are
they, in fact, emboldened by the power to overturn the decisions that
once restricted their options?
This Article examines the history and implications of the
elevation of lower federal court judges to the Supreme Court. Part I
offers an empirical analysis of the practice of elevating appellate
judges to the Supreme Court, including a discussion of the frequency
of the practice, its evolution, and the factors that motivate its use.
Part II considers the possible effects of this change in Court
composition. Social background theory provides a means of
considering how prior experience may influence current behavior. 2
This theory contends that the actions of judges can best be
understood as a product of their demographic characteristics and
personal and professional experiences such that a shared attribute,
including prior work as a circuit judge, would affect subsequent
behavior in predictable ways. 3 This Part draws on social background
12. Social background theory is sometimes referred to as personal attribute theory.
Regardless of the label, these studies hypothesize that judicial characteristics influence
judicial decisions. That is, non-legal, individual-level variables explain, in part, the
behavior of judges. In this Article and other work, I use the term "social background" to
refer to personal and professional experiences (i.e., line items on a resume) and the term
"personal attributes" to refer to largely immutable characteristics (i.e., race, sex, socio-
economic status, and religion). Theories about the influence of these two types of
variables can be distinguished on the ground that social background variables both
influence behavior and reflect behavior, whereas personal attributes can only influence
behavior. See Lee Epstein & Jack Knight, Toward a Strategic Revolution in Judicial
Politics: A Look Back, A Look Ahead, 53 POL. RES. Q. 625, 630-35 (2000) (examining
social background theory as part of a consideration of the evolution in the political
scientific study of courts). See generally Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIZ. L. REV.
9, 15-37 (2001) (offering a more recent overview of the social background literature); Joel
B. Grossman, Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decision-Making, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1551
(1966) (providing a contemporaneous review of watershed research on the relationship
between a judge's background and his decisions).
13. See, e.g., Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of
Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 491 (1975) (testing the relationships between
judicial characteristics-including personal attribute, social background, and ideological
[Vol. 861336
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scholarship and related work on role conception to develop
hypotheses about the relationship between prior appellate court
service and subsequent Supreme Court actions. Although it is too
soon to analyze systematically the behavior of the current Court
whose nine Justices all became judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals,
this Article draws on social background theory and concludes by
forecasting the behavior we will observe on this new Court.
I. THE HISTORY OF PROMOTION TO THE SUPREME COURT
Promotion from Article III inferior courts to the Supreme Court
is not a new phenomenon. Lower federal courts have been around as
long as the Supreme Court itself. 4 John Quincy Adams, in 1826, was
the first President to elevate a sitting federal judge-Kentucky
District Judge Robert Trimble-to the Supreme Court. 5  But
variables-and decisions on the U.S. Courts of Appeals); C. Neal Tate & Roger
Handberg, Time Binding and Theory Building in Personal Attribute Models of Supreme
Court Voting Behavior, 1916-88, 35 AM. J. POL. Sci. 460 (1991) (developing a social
background model of Justices' decisions and testing it empirically); S. Sidney Ulmer,
Dissent Behavior and the Social Background of Supreme Court Justices, 32 J. POL. 580
(1970) (building a social background theory of the decision to dissent).
14. The Judiciary Act of 1789, which organized the Supreme Court pursuant to
Article III and provided for the appointment of one Chief Justice and five associate
Justices, also established district courts and circuit courts. Judiciary Act of Sept. 24, 1789,
ch. 20, §§ 1-4, 1 Stat. 73, 73-75 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1 (2000)). The original
Act provided for only one district judge for each of the thirteen districts and did not
provide for any circuit judges. §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. at 73-74 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 42-
44 (2000)). Instead, two Justices and one district judge convened as the circuit court when
it was in session. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74-75 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 42-44). The original
circuits were the Southern, Middle, and Eastern. § 4, 1 Stat. at 74 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 44).
15. This claim and others regarding judicial experience are based on my review of the
biographies of all Supreme Court Justices. I consulted various sources to ensure
accuracies. Those sources include JOAN BISKUPIC & ELDER WIIT, CONGRESSIONAL
QUARTERLY'S GUIDE TO THE U.S. SUPREME COURT 845-962 (3d ed. 1997) (offering a
discussion of the characteristics of the Justices along with short individual biographies);
COMM'N ON THE BICENTENNIAL OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION, THE SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES: ITS BEGINNINGS & ITS JUSTICES 1790-1991 (1992) (presenting
very brief sketches of each Justice through Justice Thomas); LEE EPSTEIN, JEFFREY A.
SEGAL, HAROLD J. SPAETH & THOMAS G. WALKER, THE SUPREME COURT
COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS & DEVELOPMENTS 247-364 (3d ed. 2003) (presenting
detailed background information on all Supreme Court Justices through Stephen Breyer);
THE SUPREME COURT JUSTICES: ILLUSTRATED BIOGRAPHIES 1789-1995 (Clare
Cushman ed., 2d ed. 1995) (providing detailed biographical information, including
interesting trivia, and official and candid photos and drawings on all Justices through
Justice Breyer); Federal Judicial Center, History of the Federal Judiciary,
http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisj (last visited Mar. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Federal
Judicial Center] (containing biographical data compiled by the Federal Judicial Center,
which is the research and education agency of the federal courts, from extensive
governmental sources including those stored in the National Archives).
2008] 1337
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promotions were rare in the nineteenth century: only six of the fifty-
seven Justices appointed before 1900 had served on the lower federal
courts. 16
The small number of promotions during this time can be
attributed to a number of factors. First, the lower federal courts were
relatively small during most of this period. At the close of the Civil
War, there were still fewer than fifty district judges.17 Setting aside
the failed experiment of the ill-fated Midnight Judges' Bill,18 Congress
created circuit judgeships for the first time in 1869, but even then
Congress authorized only nine.19 Before that time, district judges,
with or without the allotted Justice from the U.S. Supreme Court,
heard cases assigned to the U.S. Circuit Courts.2" Thus, Presidents
had a very small pool of available federal judges to consider for
possible promotion. Consequently, Presidents were less likely to
promote from within the federal judiciary than to look outside the
courts, particularly for party faithful, to fill open seats on the High
Court.
16. The present Article focuses only on prior experience as a judge on Article III
courts (i.e., U.S. District Courts, U.S. Circuit Courts, and U.S. Courts of Appeals). The
other nineteenth century Justices with prior federal judicial experience (and the year in
which they were appointed to the Supreme Court, as well as the lower federal court(s) on
which they served) are Philip Barbour (1836, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Virginia), Peter Daniel (1841, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia),
William Burnham Woods (1880, U.S. Circuit Court for the Fifth Circuit), Samuel
Blatchford (1882, U.S. Circuit Court for the Second Circuit and U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of New York), David Brewer (1889, U.S. Circuit Court for the Eighth
Circuit), and Henry Billings Brown (1890, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Michigan). The U.S. Circuit Courts, which were created as part of the original Judiciary
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73, 74-75, which established the federal judiciary,
should not be confused with the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeals created in The Evarts Act
of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 42-44).
17. See U.S. COURTS, AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS 3, http://www.uscourts.gov/history/
judgeships/allauthorized.pdf [hereinafter AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS].
18. The lame-duck Federalist President John Adams signed legislation creating
sixteen circuit judgeships less than three weeks before the end of his term and the end of
Federalist control of Congress. Judiciary Act of 1801, ch. 4, § 7, 2 Stat. 89, 90 (repealed
1802). He then nominated Federalist judges to fill the new positions. Newly elected
President Thomas Jefferson and the Republican Congress swiftly repealed the Judiciary
Act of 1801. 4 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES, 1789-1800, ORGANIZING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 284-360 (Maeva Marcus ed.,
1992).
19. Judiciary Act of 1869, ch. 22, § 2,16 Stat. 44, 44 (current version a 28 U.S.C. § 44).
20. For a discussion of circuit court practices, see ROSCOE POUND, ORGANIZATION
OF COURTS 103-09, 194-240 (1940); and David R. Stras, Why Supreme Court Justices
Should Ride Circuit Again, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1710, 1714-26 (2007) (describing the history
of Justices sitting on circuit courts).'
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A second significant factor in the low rate of promotion was the
limited authority of district and circuit courts during their first 100
years. Before Reconstruction, disputes over federal law generally
were resolved by state, not federal, courts.2 ' Congress only granted
federal question jurisdiction to district and circuit courts in the late
nineteenth century.22 Lower court judges mostly heard admiralty
suits and diversity suits of limited import.' They rarely heard
criminal cases.24 Sitting lower court judges, then, could not claim to
have resolved the wide range of questions considered by the Supreme
Court. District and circuit judges also lacked meaningful appellate
experience. Though granted limited power to review district court
decisions in large civil suits, the circuit courts rarely exercised their
appellate authority, primarily deciding cases within their original
jurisdiction. 25  The weakness of the lower courts may explain why
Presidents and Senators did not think of the federal courts as a rich
source for Supreme Court nominees.
The lower federal courts changed dramatically at the turn of the
twentieth century. 26 The federal judiciary grew to more than 100
district and circuit judges.27  The Circuit Courts of Appeals Act of
1891,28 popularly known as the Evarts Act,2 9 created intermediate
21. See STANLEY I. KUTLER, JUDICIAL POWER AND RECONSTRUCTION POLITICS
143-60 (1968); see also William M. Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power,
1863-1875, 13 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 333, 336 (1969) (discussing removal jurisdiction in the
Reconstruction Era).
22. Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-92, 1295-96, 1330-68 (2000)).
23. The Judiciary Act of 1789 granted district and circuit courts concurrent
jurisdiction over some suits-including those brought by the United States for more than
$100 and those by aliens asserting a claim under international law-and separate
jurisdiction in others-including crimes on the high seas (exclusive in district courts) and
diversity suits (concurrent between circuit courts and state courts). See Judiciary Act of
Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76-79 (current version at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-92,
1295-96, 1330-68). In subsequent statutes, Congress tweaked lower court jurisdiction. In
their landmark empirical study of the work of the federal courts, Felix Frankfurter and
James Landis examined the technical grant of authority as well as the actual, extremely
limited exercise of this authority. See FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 12-
13 (1927) (describing the statutory grant of jurisdiction to lower courts and reviewing the
records on their caseload).
24. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 12.
25. See RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 28-38 (5th ed. 2003).
26. For a history of the development of the lower federal courts, see FRANKFURTER
& LANDIS, supra note 23, at 77-102.
27. See AUTHORIZED JUDGESHIPS, supra note 17, at 4.
28. Circuit Courts of Appeals Act of 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826 (current version at
28 U.S.C. §§ 1291-92).
20081 1339
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appellate courts.3° In addition, Congress, which was adopting federal
legislation at a rapid pace, granted federal question jurisdiction to
federal trial courts.3' With this new size and authority, the lower
federal judiciary thus became an important institution. Perhaps it is
not surprising, then, that Presidents began looking to those courts
more frequently for possible Supreme Court nominees. Since 1900,
twenty-one Justices (thirty-nine percent) had a prior judicial
appointment on an Article III court, and all but two of those served
on the courts of appeals.32
The most recent elevation of a circuit judge occurred on January
31, 2006, when George W. Bush appointed Third Circuit Judge
Samuel Alito to the Supreme Court.33 Justice Alito is the 110th
Justice and the twenty-fifth to have served on the U.S. Courts of
Appeals.34 Justice Alito's appointment marked the beginning of a
new Natural Court (i.e., a Court defined by unchanged membership),
the "Roberts 2" Court.35 Every member of the Roberts 2 Court came
directly from a federal appeals court, making this the first time that
every Justice shares that prior career experience. Justice Alito
replaced Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, who had previously served
on the Arizona State Court of Appeals, and Chief Justice Roberts
29. The Act's popular name was that of its sponsor, Senator William Evarts of New
York. See FALLON ET AL., supra note 25, at 37.
30. See Circuit Courts of Appeals Act of 1891, § 2, 26 Stat. at 826-27 (establishing
"circuit courts of appeals" that had appellate jurisdiction over district and circuit courts).
31. See Jurisdiction and Removal Act of 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, 470 (current
version at 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2000)) (extending original jurisdiction to circuit courts over
suits "where the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five
hundred dollars" and that are "arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States,
or treaties"); see also Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 13, § 291, 36 Stat. 1087, 1167 (abolishing
the circuit courts and transferring all circuit court authority, including jurisdiction, to
district courts).
32. President Woodrow Wilson appointed John Clarke to the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio in 1914 and two years later promoted Clarke to the U.S.
Supreme Court. In 1923, President Warren Harding promoted District Judge Edward
Sanford from the U.S. District Courts for the Middle and Eastern Districts of Tennessee,
where Sanford had held concurrent appointments since 1908. For a complete listing, see
infra Appendix (listing, from 1900 to 2007, all Justices who were appointed to a federal
district or appeals court, the name of the court, and length of their lower court service).
33. See David D. Kirkpatrick, Alito Sworn In as Justice After Senate Gives Approval,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2006, at A21 (describing the swearing-in ceremony for Justice Alito
and the contested Senate confirmation process that proceeded the appointment).
34. See Oyez U.S. Supreme Court Media, Samuel A. Alito, Jr., http://www.oyez.org/
justices/samuel a_alito..jr/ (last visited Apr. 8, 2008) (noting that Justice Alito is the 110th
member of the Supreme Court). For a complete list of Justices who served on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals, see infra Appendix.
35. The Roberts 1 Court included Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, whom Justice Alito
replaced.
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replaced Chief Justice William Rehnquist, who joined the Court from
the Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice.36
Although the Roberts 2 Justices all arrived directly from the
circuit courts, their lower court tenures vary greatly. Most notably,
Justice Souter served for only five months on the First Circuit, the
shortest court of appeals stint of any promoted Justice.37 Justice
Alito, in contrast, served almost sixteen years, the longest period of
circuit service by a modern Justice since Justice Horace Lurton died
in office in 1914. Figure 1 below compares the years of circuit service
for the Roberts 2 Justices.38
Fig. 1. Roberts Court: Years of Circuit Service
Stevens
Scalia
Kennedy
Souter
Thomas
Ginsburg
Breyer
Roberts
Alito
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16
Years
36. See supra note 15.
37. President George H.W. Bush appointed Justice Souter, who was serving as an
Associate Justice on the New Hampshire Supreme Court, to the First Circuit on April 30,
1990 and to the Supreme Court on October 3, 1990 (I treat the date of commission as the
first day of an appointment.). Federal Judicial Center, supra note 15.
38. Justice Stevens served for 5.18 years, Justice Scalia for 4.11, Justice Kennedy for
12.91, Justice Souter for .44, Justice Thomas for 1.62, Justice Ginsburg for 13.15, Justice
Breyer for 13.65, Chief Justice Roberts for 2.33, and Justice Alito for 15.77. Justice Alito
has the second longest period of service behind Justice Lurton, who spent nearly
seventeen years on the Sixth Circuit at the turn of the last century. In the modern era (i.e.,
since the Judges Bill of 1925 granted the Court discretion over its caseload), Justice Alito
has the longest service. Chief Justice Roberts's circuit service, by contrast, was relatively
short. It would have been much longer if he had been confirmed when he was originally
nominated to the D.C. Circuit by President George H.W. Bush in January 1992. The
Senate did not hold a hearing on that election-year nomination. See Alberto R. Gonzales,
Editorial, Double Standard Filibuster, WASH. POST, June 2, 2003, at A17.
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The circuit experience of Roberts 2 Justices differs from the
circuit experience of other Justices in Supreme Court history. For
example, the Roberts 2 Justices sat on the circuit bench twenty-three
percent longer on average than non-Roberts Justices.39 Figure 2
below compares the tenure of Roberts 2 Justices to the tenure of
earlier Justices. The vertical line connects the longest and shortest
circuit tenure for Justices in each cohort while the horizontal dash on
each line marks the average tenure. Figure 2 includes a line for the
five promoted Justices on the second Burger Natural Court ("Burger
2," June 9, 1970-September 17, 1971) when former circuit judges held
a majority of the Court for the first time.
The influence of prior judicial experience on Supreme Court
Justices may be sensitive to any intervening experience the Justice
had. That is, circuit court experience may have a greater effect on a
Justice who was promoted directly from a circuit court than on a
Justice who served in a non-judicial post between her circuit court
service and her Supreme Court service. Thurgood Marshall, for
example, had a break in his judicial tenure: he was Solicitor General
for two years between his time on the Second Circuit and the
Supreme Court.40 Only two other Justices left the federal judiciary
between the time of their appeals court and Supreme Court terms,
and they too left for public service: Frederick Vinson was the
Director of the Office of Economic Stabilization for just over two
years between serving on the D.C. Circuit (1937-1943) and on the
Supreme Court (1946-1953), and William Howard Taft was, among
other things, President during a twenty-one year hiatus from judging
on the Sixth Circuit (1892-1900) and then later the Supreme Court(1921-1930). 4
39. Justices on the Roberts Court served, on average, 7.68 years on the courts of
appeals. By comparison, earlier Justices served, on average, 6.24 years on the courts of
appeals. These figures do not include service on district courts or the original circuit
courts.
40. See JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY
296-98, 313-18, 332-33 (1998) (describing President Johnson's appointment of Marshall to
be a Second Circuit judge, Solicitor General, and finally a Supreme Court Justice and
considering the relationship between those appointments).
41. See supra note 15.
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Fig. 2. Length of U.S. Court of Appeals Service: Comparison Across Courts
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The identity of the circuit on which a Justice served may be as
important as the length of time that a Justice served as a circuit judge.
Circuits have distinct reputations, dockets, and norms.42 Not every
circuit is represented in the hall of Justices.4 3 Justice Alito is the first
42. See, e.g., DONALD R. SONGER, REGINALD S. SHEEHAN & SUSAN B. HAIRE,
CONTINUITY AND CHANGE ON THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF APPEALS 119-30 (2000)
(describing regional differences across circuits). See generally J. WOODFORD HOWARD,
JR., COURTS OF APPEALS IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM: A STUDY OF THE
SECOND, FIFTH, AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUITS (1981) (demonstrating, in this
in-depth empirical study of the federal courts of appeals, the distinctive features of the
various circuits).
43. I do not include here the Federal Circuit because it is such a unique court of
appeals with limited subject matter jurisdiction and an unusual history. The Federal
Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.), created this Article III court by merging the U.S. Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals and the U.S. Court of Claims. Id. Patent and trademark
suits comprised thirty-seven percent of the court's merits decisions in fiscal year 2007 and
money suits against the United States accounted for another seventeen percent. U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Statistics, http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/
statistics.html (follow "Appeals Adjudicated by Merits Panels 2007" hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 24, 2008). Remaining cases involved various administrative law claims
including veterans' claims, international trade disputes, and federal government personnel
matters. See id. Moreover, the appointment process for federal circuit judges has been
distinctive: most nominees have particular expertise in a relevant field and few nominees
have been subjected to the kind of close Senate scrutiny visited on nominees for other
courts. For a discussion of the court's current place, see generally S. Jay Plager, The Price
of Popularity: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 2007, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 751,
753-54 (2007) (The Federal Circuit Chief Judge in this annual essay argues that the court
is no longer "specialized" in that its influence has expanded far beyond the limited bounds
that the term "specialized" implies.).
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Third Circuit judge to join the High Court. No judges have been
elevated from the Fourth, Fifth, Tenth," or Eleventh circuits. 4  The
Eleventh, of course, has only been in existence since 1980.46 The
absence of the Fourth and Fifth Circuits is surprising because they
have both long been prominent circuits. The Fifth Circuit's
prominence owes in part to its historically large size. In much the way
the Ninth Circuit dominates our current discussions of the courts of
appeals, the Fifth Circuit was often the primary focus in judicial
reform discussions in the recent past.47 In addition, the civil rights
disputes of the last century played out primarily in that court.48 The
Fourth Circuit, too, saw many of those highly contested cases, and it
surrounds the nation's capitol.4 9 Although Presidents did try to name
judges from both the Fourth and Fifth Circuits to the Supreme Court,
they simply did not succeed. 0
44. The 1929 division of the Eighth Circuit created the Tenth, Act of Feb. 28, 1929, ch.
363, § 1, 45 Stat. 1346, 1346-47 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 41 (2000)) which has had
thirty-eight judges in its nearly eighty years. Federal Judicial Center, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, Legislative History, http://www.fjc.gov/public/home.nsf/hisc
(follow "U.S. Courts of Appeals" hyperlink; then follow "Tenth Circuit" hyperlink) (last
visited Mar. 24, 2008).
45. See supra note 15.
46. See Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals Reorganization Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
452, 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. (94 Stat.) 4236 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 41) (dividing
the Fifth Circuit into two circuits: the modified Fifth, which included the District of Canal
Zone, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Texas; and the new Eleventh, which included Alabama,
Florida, and Georgia).
47. For a discussion of the history and division of the Fifth Circuit, see generally
DEBORAH J. BARROW & THOMAS G. WALKER, A COURT DIVIDED: THE FIFTH
CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS AND THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL REFORM (1988).
48. See HOWARD, supra note 42, at 31-32 (noting that civil rights cases were "heavily
litigated in the [Fifth Clircuit"). See generally J.W. PELTASON, FIFTY-EIGHT LONELY
MEN: SOUTHERN FEDERAL JUDGES AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION 93-134 (1961)
(analyzing federal courts' struggles with public school desegregation).
49. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit, see Tracey E. George, Developing a
Positive Theory of Decisionmaking on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 1635,
1669-70 (1998) (discussing a combined attitudinal and strategic model of en banc court of
appeals decisionmaking).
50. Several nominations to a single seat failed. On June 26, 1968, President Johnson
nominated then-associate Justice Abe Fortas to replace Earl Warren as Chief Justice and
also nominated Fifth Circuit Judge Homer Thornberry to the opening that would be
created after the anticipated confirmation of Fortas as Chief. Judge Thornberry lost his
opportunity when Justice Fortas was forced to withdraw on October 4, 1968, and
ultimately resigned from the Court on May 14, 1969, mere months after President Nixon
succeeded President Johnson. President Nixon initially had as little luck as President
Johnson in filling the seat. President Nixon's first two nominees were rejected by the
Senate: the Senate first rejected Fourth Circuit Judge Clement Haynsworth on November
21, 1969, by a vote of forty-five to fifty-five, and then rejected Fifth Circuit Judge G.
Harrold Carswell on April 8, 1970, by a vote of forty-five to fifty-one. Almost exactly one
year to the day following Justice Fortas's resignation, Eighth Circuit Judge Harry
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The D.C. Circuit, with seven promoted judges, has become the
most common circuit path to the Supreme Court. Four current
Justices-Thomas, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Roberts-all came from
that court. However, until 1993 the Sixth Circuit was a more frequent
launching pad, with five members promoted to the High Court. The
Eighth Circuit was right behind with four members. But, today,
neither the Sixth nor the Eighth Circuit has a single spot on the
Supreme Court."' If circuit experience in general, rather than the
experience on a specific circuit, influences Justices' behavior, then the
change in circuits is historically interesting but irrelevant to
forecasting. If, however, the effect of prior court of appeals
experience is conditional on circuit, then the change in circuits may
also mean a change in Supreme Court behavior.
Fig. 3. Circuit Representation Fig. 3A. Circuit Representation
on the Supreme Court on the Roberts 2 Court
DC W rd
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While the Roberts 2 Court is the first Natural Court to be
comprised entirely of circuit judges, it likely will not be the last.
Presidents today regularly look to the judiciary when appointing not
Blackmun finally succeeded in obtaining Senate approval. See HENRY J. ABRAHAM,
JUSTICES, PRESIDENTS, AND SENATORS: A HISTORY OF THE U.S. SUPREME COURT
APPOINTMENTS FROM WASHINGTON TO CLINTON 10-14 (4th ed. 1999) (recounting
President Nixon's efforts to fill the Fortas seat); United States Senate, Supreme Court
Nominations, 1789-present, available at http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/
nominations/reverseNominations.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2008). See generally KENNETH
W. GOINGS, THE NAACP COMES OF AGE: THE DEFEAT OF JUDGE JOHN J. PARKER
(1990) (recounting the NAACP's successful challenge to President Hoover's nomination
of Fourth Circuit Judge John J. Parker to the Supreme Court).
51. See supra note 15.
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only Supreme Court Justices, but also circuit and district judges.5"
Roughly half of circuit judges appointed since 1990 have had prior
judicial experience.53 And, numerous magistrate and bankruptcy
judges-who are Article I judges-are promoted to the district
courts.5 4
Promotion from within the federal judiciary is appealing for
several reasons. First, there is the perception that the Senate is more
likely to confirm nominees who are already judges and that they will
act relatively quickly in doing so. For example, during the collapse of
the Harriet Miers nomination, several Senators, law professors, and
commentators cited her lack of judicial experience as a serious
weakness in her candidacy for the Supreme Court.55 Second, sitting
judges are likely-perhaps the most likely among all lawyers-to
desire higher judicial office and to have the fortitude required to
undergo the appointments process. The initial judicial appointment is
a strong signal of an interest in serving as a judge as well as a
willingness to forego benefits, including a higher salary, offered by
most other legal occupations.56 Federal judges also are better able to
withstand the scrutiny and frustration associated with the nomination
52. For a detailed discussion of the lower court judicial selection process, including a
consideration of the professionalization of the judiciary, see generally SHELDON
GOLDMAN, PICKING FEDERAL JUDGES: LOWER COURT SELECTION FROM ROOSEVELT
THROUGH REAGAN (1997).
53. See id. at 353, 356 n.b (finding that "[o]ver half of the [courts of appeals]
appointees of each administration had had previous judicial experience" and "[t]he large
majority of lower-court elevations were from the federal district bench").
54. See Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerard Gryski & Sara Schiavoni, Picking
Judges in a Time of Turmoil: W. Bush's Judiciary During the 109th Congress, 90
JUDICATURE 252, 264 (2007) (discussing the appointment of federal magistrate and
bankruptcy judges, as well as state judges, to federal district judgeships); Federal Judicial
Center, supra note 15 (based on a review of the Federal Judicial Center's data on federal
judicial characteristics).
55. The Miers nomination produced thousands of news stories. For discussions of
Senators' and others' concerns about her judicial inexperience, see, for example, Charles
Babington & Thomas B. Edsall, Conservative Republicans Divided Over Nominee, WASH.
POST, Oct. 4, 2005, at All; Peter Baker & Dan Balz, Miers To Face Tougher Time than
Roberts in Hearings, WASH. POST, Oct. 9, 2005, at Al; Elisabeth Bumiller & David D.
Kirkpatrick, Bush Fends Off Sharp Criticism of Court Choice, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2005, at
Al; Lynette Clemetson & Jonathan D. Glater, Quiet Force for Change in a Male-
Dominated Era, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at A30; and Shailagh Murray & Charles
Babington, Miers Makes Rounds on Hill, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2005, at A6.
56. Chief Justice William Rehnquist, in fact, complained about the growing
professionalization of the federal judiciary in one of his annual reports on the state of the
federal courts. He attributed the professionalization to several factors including relatively
low and stagnant salaries. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, 2001 YEAR-END REPORT ON
THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/year-end/2001year-
endreport.html.
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process because the Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of
Investigation have already vetted them.57 They have survived
meetings with Senators, a committee hearing, and a full Senate vote.
They also have been subject to intense scrutiny by interest groups
which scrutinize circuit and even district court nominees with
increasing frequency. 8 Finally, sitting judges can keep their current
position without financial hardship due to loss of clients or other
business or other difficulties during a possibly long-and perhaps
unsuccessful-nomination process. Chief Justice Rehnquist warned
Congress in 2001: "The combination of inadequate pay and a drawn-
out and uncertain confirmation process ... restricts the universe of
lawyers in private practice who are willing to be nominated for a
federal judgeship."59
Nevertheless, the single most important factor in judicial
promotion from within the federal judiciary is information:
Presidents can more readily ascertain the policy positions and voting
behavior of sitting judges. As Lee Epstein and Jeff Segal explain in
their study of judicial appointment politics, Presidents seek to avoid
the mistakes of their predecessors through "extensive screening....
This may explain why over half of [President George W. Bush's] (and
his immediate predecessors') appointments have gone to individuals
who have served or were serving as judges, an occupation that
requires its members to write."6
The White House will view the judicial record as possibly the
most reliable source of information on a candidate's views.6' A
57. See GOLDMAN, supra note 52, at 9-13 (describing briefly the mechanics of judicial
selection from beginning to end).
58. During George W. Bush's first term, Democrats in the Senate successfully
filibustered ten circuit court nominees. See Annie Chiappetta, Primer: Judicial Nominees
and the Filibuster, ABC NEWS, Apr. 25, 2005, http://www.abcnews.go.com/politics/story?
id=683438; see also John Stanton, Bush Offers New List of Judicial Nominees, ROLL CALL,
Jan. 10, 2007, at 1 (noting that the Senate filibustered four George W. Bush nominees for
the courts of appeals during the first half of Bush's second term). Civil rights groups can
claim a great deal of credit for the very first filibustered nominee to a lower federal court,
Miguel Estrada. See Neil A. Lewis, Stymied by Democrats, Bush Court Pick Finally Gives
Up, N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 2003, at Al. For an examination of the politicization of the lower
court selection process, see generally NANCY SCHERER, SCORING POINTS: POLITICIANS,
ACTIVISTS, AND THE LOWER FEDERAL COURT APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (2005)
(arguing the lower federal court appointment process is more politically relevant than
Supreme Court nominations).
59. See REHNQUIST, supra note 56.
60. LEE EPSTEIN & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, ADVICE AND CONSENT: THE POLITICS OF
JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 63 (2005).
61. See, e.g., Elisha Carol Savchak, Thomas G. Hansford, Donald R. Songer, Kenneth
L. Manning & Robert A. Carp, Taking It to the Next Level: The Elevation of District
Court Judges to the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 50 AM. J. POL. Sci. 478, 479 (2006) (observing,
20081
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candidate may overstate in an interview her level of agreement with
the President's ideological positions, but she is unlikely to do so in
judicial votes and opinions where the costs of doing so are high (i.e., a
vote against her true preferences) as compared to the potential
benefits (i.e., the extremely low probability of elevation for any
individual judge).62 Whereas a President can only hypothesize how a
practicing lawyer might act once the lawyer dons robes, a President
knows how a circuit judge behaves on the bench. Furthermore,
Presidents expect sitting judges to adapt more quickly to a new
judicial post. A smooth and rapid transition increases the speed with
which a judge can influence the law. For all these reasons, Presidents
must believe that prior judicial experience is related to future
Supreme Court behavior. In the next Part, I consider whether the
relationship likely is causal (i.e., circuit court service influences
Supreme Court decisions) or spurious (i.e., any correlation between
the two variables reflects the influence of a third factor).
II. SOCIAL BACKGROUND THEORY AND THE JUDICIAL ROLE
Justices arrive with attitudes and abilities developed over
decades. Those experiences clearly will affect their behavior on the
Court.63 Their views on subjects governed by law will be influenced
by salient events in their pasts. It can be difficult to predict or
measure the effects of the varied socialization processes or to contend
that a certain experience will affect all individuals in the same way.
in a study of circuit appointments, that "the policy-relevant behavior of district judges is
manifested under a set of constraints that are relatively similar to the constraints that will
be faced by an appeals court judge" making district judges particularly appealing circuit
nominees as compared to other "potential nominees" whose "record ... may not provide
as reliable an indicator of the policy choices they would make as a federal judge").
62. See CHRISTINE L. NEMACHECK, STRATEGIC SELECTION: PRESIDENTIAL
NOMINATION OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES FROM HERBERT HOOVER THROUGH
GEORGE W. BUSH 113-14 (2007) (hypothesizing that Presidents are more likely to select
nominees who are sitting judges because they are unlikely to misrepresent their
preferences in their judicial decisions because the likely gain from doing so-appointment
to the Supreme Court-is so remote).
63. See, e.g., Shirley S. Abrahamson, The Woman Has Robes: Four Questions, 14
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 489, 492-94 (1984). In the article, she related her answers to
questions about her likely behavior as a judge:
What does my being a woman specially bring to the bench? It brings me and my
special background. All my life experiences-including being a woman-affect
me and influence me.... My point is that nobody is just a woman or a man. Each
of us is a person with diverse experiences. Each of us brings to the bench
experiences that affect our view of law and life and decision-making.
Id. at 492-93.
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However, various studies have had some success finding a causal
relationship between specific characteristics and subsequent judicial
actions.
In this Part, I begin by reviewing relevant social background
literature, surveying briefly the treatment of common explanatory
variables including career socialization. As explained below, most
research focuses on how experiences influence votes on case
outcomes. I argue instead that the effect of prior employment is more
subtle and complex for judges elevated to the Supreme Court: prior
judicial experience affects the way a judge conceives of her role as a
judge, which is reflected in the types of actions she takes rather than
the ideological direction of those actions.' I end by delineating a
series of hypotheses about the effect of circuit experience on judicial
role conception, arguing ultimately that circuit experience affects
behavior on the Court.
A. Social Background as a Predictor of Judicial Decisions
Social scientific study of the judiciary has sought to explain
judicial behavior by building on our understanding of human
behavior generally. Political scientists in the Sixties developed a
social background theory of judicial behavior that grew out of
theories developed in social and cognitive psychology.65 The theory
provides a means to explain judicial behavior based on the lives
judges lead prior to appointment.66 Social background theory "holds
64. Types of actions are intended to capture the range of behaviors available to a
judge in her formal role, including writing versus signing, willingness to dissent and/or
concur, voting for en banc review, willingness to reverse lower courts, taking positions
contrary to precedent, and overturning precedent.
65. See, e.g., STUART S. NAGEL, THE LEGAL PROCESS FROM A BEHAVIORAL
PERSPECTIVE (1969); GLENDON SCHUBERT, THE JUDICIAL MIND: THE ATTITUDES
AND IDEOLOGIES OF SUPREME COURT JUSTICES, 1946-1963 (1965) (developing a model
of judicial decisionmaking based on social psychological studies of human behavior by
Louis Thurstone, Clyde Coombs, and Louis Guttman); JOHN SPRAGUE, VOTING
PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: CASES IN FEDERALISM 1889-1959
(1968); Sheldon Goldman, Backgrounds, Attitudes and the Voting Behavior of Judges: A
Comment on Joel Grossman's Social Backgrounds and Judicial Decisions, 31 J. POL. 214
(1969); Sheldon Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1961-
64, 60 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 374 (1966) [hereinafter Goldman, Voting Behavior] (examining
the relationship between various background variables and appellate judges' behavior);
Grossman, supra note 12; John R. Schmidhauser, Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the
Backgrounds of Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 14 U. TORONTO L.J.
194 (1962); Kenneth N. Vines, Federal District Judges and Race Relations Cases in the
South, 26 J. POL. 337 (1964).
66. See, e.g., Jilda M. Aliotta, Social Backgrounds, Social Motive and Participation on
the U.S. Supreme Court, 10 POL. BEHAV. 267, 267-68 (1988); S. Sidney Ulmer, Social
2008] 1349
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that a range of political, socioeconomic, family, and professional
background characteristics account for judicial behavior, or at the
very least, help to explain the formation of particular attitudes.
' 67
Social background theory has made meaningful contributions to
our understanding of judicial behavior, highlighting the relationship
between an array of characteristics and judicial decisions. While
certain variables like age, 68 religion,69 and education7 ° are not
Background as an Indicator to the Votes of Supreme Court Justices in Criminal Cases:
1947-1956 Terms, 17 AM. J. POL. SCI. 622, 624-25 (1973).
67. Epstein & Knight, supra note 12, at 630.
68. Compare Beverly Blair Cook, Sentencing Behavior of Federal Judges: Draft
Cases-1972, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 597, 623-24 (1973) (discerning no relationship between a
judge's age and the severity of sentences given to draft offenders), and Goldman, Voting
Behavior, supra note 65, at 382 (finding that older judges were not more conservative than
younger judges), and Charles M. Lamb, Exploring the Conservatism of Federal Appeals
Court Judges, 51 IND. L.J. 257, 267-70, 277 (1975) (finding that during the course of their
tenure, some District of Columbia circuit judges voted more conservatively while others
became slightly more liberal), and C. Neal Tate, Personal Attribute Models of Voting
Behavior of U.S. Supreme Court Justices: Liberalism in Civil Liberties and Economics
Decisions, 1946-1978, 75 AM. POL. SCt. REV. 355, 359-63 (1981) (finding that age was not
a meaningful explanation of Justices' votes when the influence of party affiliation and
other judicial characteristics were controlled), with Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn
Johnson, The Effects of Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL
L. REV. 1151, 1189-90 tbl.4 (1991) (reporting that judicial age was statistically significantly
related to rulings on intent in race discrimination suits). One criticism of age as a variable
is that any observed differences in judicial behavior may be attributable to missing
variables, such as generational, socialization, and tenure effects. See James L. Gibson,
From Simplicity to Complexity: The Development of Theory in the Study of Judicial
Behavior, 5 POL. BEHAV. 7, 24 (1983). If this is true, any attribution of voting variations to
judicial age would be spurious.
69. There are several inherent difficulties with constructing a sound model of the
effect of religious identification on judicial behavior. First, the strength of religious
identification varies substantially among individuals such that a simple binary classification
(e.g., Catholic or not) cannot capture the intensity of the identification and the resulting
influence. Second, the perspectives of religious groups vary over time; thus, any
hypothesized relationship is time-bound. Third, religious affiliation has a dynamic
relationship with socioeconomic status. See, e.g., Deborah Jones Merritt & James J.
Brudney, Stalking Secret Law: What Predicts Publication in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 54 VAND. L. REV. 71, 110 tbl.X (2001) (failing to find a statistically significant
relationship between circuit judges' religious identification and their votes in unfair labor
practices suits); Tate & Handberg, supra note 13, at 473, 474 tbl.1 (concluding that religion
was not related to Supreme Court Justices' decisions for the period 1916 through 1988).
70. The evidence on the relationship between educational background and judicial
decisions is mixed. A few studies have found that prestige of college and of law school
have a weak positive correlation with economic liberalism and receptivity to civil rights
and liberties claims in judicial decisions. See, e.g., James J. Brudney, Sara Schiavoni &
Deborah J. Merritt, Judicial Hostility Toward Labor Unions? Applying the Social
Background Model to a Celebrated Concern, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1675, 1715 tbl.II, 1716 tbl.III
(1999) (finding a relationship between college selectivity and union support among lower
federal court judges but failing to find a relationship between law school selectivity and
union support); Micheal W. Giles & Thomas G. Walker, Judicial Policy-Making and
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consistently correlated with judicial behavior, other social
background variables have demonstrated explanatory power for at
least some kinds of decisions.
Scholars, for example, have long hypothesized that women7' and
minorities7 2 should behave differently from men and whites,
respectively, in cases in which identity is salient and there is some
Southern School Segregation, 37 J. POL. 917, 930-31 (1975) (failing to find a relationship
between education and the school desegregation decisions of federal district judges);
Goldman, Voting Behavior, supra note 65, at 382 (finding no relationship between
education and votes of federal circuit judges); Stuart S. Nagel, Multiple Correlation of
Judicial Backgrounds and Decisions, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 258, 270-71 (1974) (finding
that state supreme court judges who attended high-tuition law schools were more
receptive to defendants' rights claims than were those who attended low-tuition law
schools but finding little difference in economic cases); Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise &
Andrew P. Morriss, Charting the Influences on the Judicial Mind: An Empirical Study of
Judicial Reasoning, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1377, 1463-65 (1998) (failing to find a relationship
between elite law school education and district judges' votes on the constitutionality of the
federal sentencing guidelines); Tate, supra note 68, at 362-63 (finding a relationship
between college prestige and Justices' economic liberalism but not between college
prestige and civil rights and liberties liberalism).
71. See Nancy E. Crowe, The Effects of Judges' Sex and Race on Judicial Decision
Making on the United States Courts of Appeals, 1981-1996, at 100-01, 159-60 (June 1999)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, available through The University of Chicago Dissertation
Office at the Joseph Regenstein Library) (concluding, after a systematic consideration of
courts of appeals decisions from 1981 through 1996, that female judges were more likely
than male judges to vote in favor of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases claiming
gender bias but not in cases claiming race bias); Sue Davis, Susan Haire & Donald R.
Songer, Voting Behavior and Gender on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 77 JUDICATURE 129,
132 tbl.3, 132-33 (1993) (finding that (1) Democratic women appointed to the courts of
appeals voted in favor of employees in employment discrimination cases more often than
Democratic men, but that Republican women and men were indistinguishable, and (2)
male and female judges did not vote statistically significantly different in obscenity cases
although Republicans and Democrats did); Donald R. Songer et al., A Reappraisal of
Diversification in the Federal Courts: Gender Effects in the Courts of Appeals, 56 J. POL.
425, 436 (1994) (finding that circuit judge gender had a statistically significant-though
relatively weak-impact on job discrimination decisions); see also Christina L. Boyd, Lee
Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Untangling the Causal Effects of Sex on Judging app.A
(unpublished manuscript, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1001748) (providing a
summary of multivariate analyses of the effect of sex on judging). But see Gerard S.
Gryski, Eleanor C. Main & William J. Dixon, Models of State High Court Decision Making
in Sex Discrimination Cases, 48 J. POL. 143, 152-53 (1986) (failing to find a significant
relationship between a state high court judge's gender and decisions in sex discrimination
suits).
72. See Sheldon Goldman, Should There Be Affirmative Action for the Judiciary?, 62
JUDICATURE 488, 494 (1979) (arguing that minority judges will inevitably bring "a certain
sensitivity-indeed, certain qualities of the heart and mind-that may be particularly
helpful in dealing with [issues of racial and sexual discrimination]"); Crowe, supra note 71,
at 84 (finding that, after controlling for party identification in a multivariate analysis,
African American circuit judges were much more receptive than were white judges to
employment discrimination claims).
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evidence of such a relationship.73 But, most studies fail to find that
sex or race have a consistent or substantial effect on judges' votes in
cases in which we might expect sex or race to play a role.74 This
failure, however, may be due to methodological challenges rather
than the absence of an effect. In a recent paper, Christina Boyd, Lee
Epstein, and Andrew Martin overcame these challenges by taking a
highly creative approach to disentangling the relationship between
sex and votes in gender discrimination suits. They used a matching
strategy whereby they matched judges who shared salient background
characteristics except for sex and looked to see whether they voted in
the same way. They found that male judges were much less likely
than female judges to decide in favor of the party alleging
discrimination.75 The authors' matching strategy might also prove
valuable for analyzing race and judging.
The most success has been found in establishing a relationship
between political preferences and judicial behavior. It is well
established that political affiliation of a judge or appointing President
is a strong predictor of how a judge will vote in a case.76 A Democrat
who served as a U.S. Attorney likely will be more liberal, even on
73. See Max M. Schanzenbach, Racial and Gender Disparities in Prison Sentences:
The Effect of District-Level Judicial Demographics, 34 J. LEGAL STUD. 57, 80 (2005)
(finding that "the greater the proportion of female judges in a district, the lower the sex
disparity" in prison sentences, which he attributes to "paternalistic bias" in male judges,
but finding "mixed effects" for racial composition of a district and the length of sentences
given to minority defendants).
74. See Merritt & Brudney, supra note 69, at 109-10 tbl.X (finding no relationship
between black racial identity and votes in unpublished, unfair labor practices circuit court
decisions); Jennifer Segal, Representative Decision Making on the Federal Bench: Clinton's
District Court Appointees, 53 POL. RES. Q. 137, 147-48 (2000) (concluding, based on an
examination of district court decisions, that women and minorities appointed by Clinton to
the district courts were neither more responsive to claims of disadvantaged groups nor
more liberal or activist than Clinton's white male appointees).
75. See Boyd, Epstein & Martin, supra note 71, at 25. They also report that men on
panels with at least one female judge are more sympathetic to rights claimants than men
on all-male panels. Id. at 27.
76. See, e.g., Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience
to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155,
2175-76 (1998); Daniel R. Pinello, Linking Party to Judicial Ideology in American Courts:
A Meta-Analysis, 20 JUST. SYs. J. 219 (1999) (meta-analyzing eighty-four empirical studies
of the relationship between judges' party identification and judicial behavior and
concluding that party affiliation explains a substantial amount of the variance in the
ideological direction of judicial decisions, particularly on federal courts, where it explains
thirty-eight percent of the variance); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation,
Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719 (1997). Presidents rarely look
outside their own party for judicial nominees: more than ninety percent of federal court
judges since President Franklin D. Roosevelt have been members of the President's party.
See EPSTEIN, SEGAL, SPAETH & WALKER, supra note 15, at 249.
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criminal issues, than a Republican without prosecutorial experience.
The theoretical basis for this relationship is less clear. A judge may
have been influenced by his earlier involvement in a political party.
For example, volunteering with a political campaign could lead a
person to adopt views held by the candidate or at least strengthen a
commitment to positions shared in common with the candidate. Or,
the judge may have joined the party because it reflected his
preexisting views. In the former case, political party membership is a
cause, in part, of a judge's policy preferences. This generally would
be the social background account. In the latter, political party
membership is a product of a judge's policy preferences. Rational
actor theory, which hypothesizes that individuals take actions likely to
increase the probability of achieving a goal, explains party affiliation
in this way-it is a proxy for policy goals.
Professional experience also poses this difficulty to a certain
extent: a job may simultaneously reflect and affect the views of the
person who holds it. I expect that both are relevant for Supreme
Court Justices. Hence, any demonstrated relationship between
professional experience and judicial decisions likely is attributable
both to the experience and to the preexisting attitudes that lead the
judge to seek out that professional experience. Researchers have
considered the influence of career socialization processes on judicial
behavior, focusing particularly on experience as a prosecutor," a
public or elected official, 78 an academic, 79 or a judge on another
court.80
Studies of prosecutorial experience, like most studies of social
background, hypothesize that the experience will influence the
ideological direction of judges' decisions. Researchers have
hypothesized that prosecutors are more likely than other judges to
77. See infra text accompanying notes 81-82.
78. See, e.g., Brudney, Schiavoni & Merritt, supra note 70, at 1681 (reporting that
former elected officials were more likely than their colleagues to support labor union
claims); Goldman, supra note 13, at 501-03 (finding that judges with prior political
experience were somewhat less likely to favor the government in fiscal cases); Donald
Songer, Jeffrey Segal & Charles Cameron, The Hierarchy of Justice: Testing a Principal-
Agent Model of Supreme Court-Circuit Court Interactions, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 673, 679-80
(1994) (testing a multidimensional attitude variable based on a court of appeals judge's
appointing President, region, prior prosecutorial or judicial experience, and religion);
Tate, supra note 68, at 359-63 (discovering that Justices who previously held elective
office were more liberal on economic questions).
79. See, e.g., George, supra note 12, at 14 (finding that academic experience was not a
proxy for a particular policy preference but that it was associated with greater activism on
the bench).
80. See infra text accompanying notes 83-86.
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vote against criminal defendants because former prosecutors devoted
some part of their lives to capturing and convicting wrongdoers.8
Judges with prosecutorial experience may be more likely to support
the government's position in other cases as well. After all,
prosecutors act to enforce statutes and to maintain the status quo.
Neal Tate has hypothesized that former prosecutors may be
more conservative than other judges in a range of non-criminal cases
including civil liberties and economic suits because "prosecutors
spend most of their time defending the position of the 'haves' against
the criminal attacks of the 'have nots.' Such experience would
logically engender sympathetic attitudes toward economic 'top
dogs.' "82 Some empirical evidence supports this hypothesis, yet the
question of a missing variable lingers. That is, do these models fail to
capture some element of an underlying "law-and-order" stance that
motivates both judicial behavior and career choices? Fighting for
convictions may lead a prosecutor to hold conservative, law-and-
order views, or these views may be the reason that a lawyer becomes
a prosecutor, or perhaps both.
Studies likewise have evaluated how judicial experience may
influence attitudes about case outcomes. Scholars have hypothesized
that lawyers who served as judges, particularly on the trial bench,
acted to protect the interests of the underprivileged more frequently
than did lawyers who represented private clients. Hence, prior
judicial experience may result in greater receptivity to claims of
discrimination, bias, and the like.83 On the other hand, judges bear
81. See, e.g., Richard E. Johnston, Supreme Court Voting Behavior: A Comparison of
the Warren and Burger Courts, in CASES IN AMERICAN POLITICS 108-09 (Robert L.
Peabody ed., 1976) (finding that Justices with prosecutorial experience were more
conservative in criminal procedure cases as well as economic cases); Stuart S. Nagel,
Judicial Backgrounds and Criminal Cases, 53 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 333, 335-36
(1962) (finding that former prosecutors on state supreme courts were more likely than
their colleagues to vote against criminal defendants); Stuart S. Nagel, Multiple Correlation
of Judicial Backgrounds and Decisions, 2 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 258, 266 tbl.1 (1974)
(demonstrating that former-prosecutor judges had an above average prosecution
propensity for their respective state supreme courts, although prosecutorial experience
accounted for a small amount (three percent) of the difference between prosecutors' and
non-prosecutors' votes).
82. Tate, supra note 68, at 359-63 (showing, after controlling for various individual
attributes, that Justices without prosecutorial experience are more favorable to civil
liberties claims and economic underdogs than those with prosecutorial experience, though
judicial experience between time as a prosecutor and appointment to the Supreme Court
moderates the prosecutor effect).
83. See Tate & Handberg, supra note 13, at 470 ("[J]udicial experience will make
attorneys more liberal, since the judge, unlike the attorney, must always fairly weigh both
sides of a dispute, even if one side is that of a socially less privileged litigant.").
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responsibility for upholding the law; therefore, judicial experience
may make a person more conservative. While a Supreme Court study
has been published lending support to each of these contradictory
propositions,' most research concludes that judicial experience and
voting are unrelated.85 Studies of courts of appeals and district courts
have generally failed to find a significant relationship between a
judge's experience on another court and her subsequent rulings.'
The meaningful effects of career socialization may be seen not in
the direction of a judge's vote, but rather in the judge's role
conception. A Justice who learned how to be a judge on a lower
court may fulfill his duties in a different manner than his colleagues
from private practice or public service. In the next Section, I explain
what I mean by "role conception" and how it may influence judicial
behavior.
B. Role Conception as a Predictor of Judicial Actions
Role conception encompasses the judge's normative view of his
position, including his beliefs about the authority of the individual
judge in the legal system, the proper functioning of a judicial body,
and the appropriate way to operate in a collegial setting.' As a
general matter, those views tell us less about the ideological direction
84. Compare Tate, supra note 68, at 362 (finding, in a study of Supreme Court
decisions from 1946 through 1978, that Justices who had served on another court were
more receptive to civil rights and liberties claims regardless of their party identification,
other experiences, or personal attributes), with Richard E. Johnston, Supreme Court
Voting Behavior: A Comparison of the Warren and Burger Courts, in CASES IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 71 (Robert L. Peabody ed., 1976) (observing a correlation between
a Justice's prior federal judicial experience and conservative civil liberties and economics
rulings).
85. See Tate & Handberg, supra note 13, at 474-76 (concluding, in a study of Supreme
Court decisions from 1916 through 1988, that prior judicial experience was not related to
civil rights and liberties decisions and only very weakly related to economic rulings).
86. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter et al., Politics and the Judiciary: The Influence of
Judicial Background on Case Outcomes, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 257, 277-81 (1995)
(concluding that district judges' votes appeared unrelated to their judicial background);
Brudney, Schiavoni & Merritt, supra note 70, at 1715 tbl.II (failing to discern a
relationship between prior judicial experience and votes in support of unions in circuit
court rulings); Goldman, Voting Behavior, supra note 65, at 381-82 (finding no
relationship between prior judicial experience and judicial decisions generally or after
controlling for party affiliation); Goldman, supra note 13, at 504 (determining that circuit
judges with prior judicial experience were no more liberal or conservative than other
judges).
87. Cf James L. Gibson, Judges' Role Orientations, Attitudes, and Decisions: An
Interactive Model, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 911 (1978). Gibson's "role orientation" thesis is
slightly distinct from my "role conception" thesis. He describes judges' individual role
orientations as dictating "the criteria upon which their decisions will be based." Id. at 918.
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of a judge's behavior than about the range of behavior he is willing to
take. A judge's role conception impacts the frequency with which he
will pursue his preferences sincerely without consideration of other
concerns. But, it also informs non-voting behavior such as opinion
writing, coalition formation, oral argument questioning, public
speaking, and so on.
Judicial studies occasionally assume-implicitly or explicitly-
that judges share a stable view of the judicial role: role conception
remains relatively fixed across judges and meaningful variation is
primarily explained by considering the judges' preferences on the
issues. While models based only on judges' preferences can account
for a great deal of the variation in votes on the merits of Supreme
Court cases and in certain classes of courts of appeals rulings, these
models can be improved by considering the influence of role
conception on the ultimate vote in a case as well as in other judicial
actions.
Judges vested with discretion, as Supreme Court Justices almost
always are, base their decisions on their preferences in a particular
case as well as their role conception. A judge's view of the
appropriate resolution of the dispute, as measured by either the legal
or attitudinal model (or a hybrid), likely has a stronger-much
stronger-effect than a judge's role conception on a judge's decision
on the merits of a case.88 A vote reflects the judge's underlying view
on the issues, and role conception says less about that, at least in any
sort of consistent way. Nevertheless, a judge's view of her function in
resolving disputes and interpreting the law will serve as the screen
through which the judge's preferences or legal determinations are
filtered. The judge who perceives her role as primarily institutional
will filter out viewpoints that are inconsistent with the institution's
preferences, whether measured by the views of current colleagues or
prior ones. A judge with a more individualistic, and typically activist,
perspective will be more likely to pursue her viewpoint unfiltered and
unconstrained. Therefore, individualistic judges will more frequently
decide cases according to their preferences as compared to
institutionally oriented judges.
88. The legal model treats judicial decisions as a product of "the law" while the
attitudinal model treats judicial decisions as a product of judges' attitudes (or policy
preferences). For an explanation of both models, see Tracey E. George & Lee Epstein,
On the Nature of Supreme Court Decision Making, 86 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 323, 324-28
(1992) (explaining the evolution and status of the legal and extralegal models and
estimating a legal model and an extralegal model of Supreme Court decisions in death
penalty cases).
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The judge's perspective on his role, on archetypal judicial
behavior, will be more important than his preferences in explaining
the method by which the judge carries out his view of the case. The
strength of preferences clearly will affect a judge's desire to state the
court's reasons for its decision or to air publicly his disagreement with
the majority. However, the judge's view of the judicial function-the
purpose of those actions-will predominate. Thus, a judge who sees
himself as part of a group undertaking, a team, is unlikely to work
against the group by acting independently, by dissenting or
concurring separately, even when his opinion on the legal issues is
strong. By contrast, a judge who sees herself as an independent actor,
responsible for honestly relaying her views on cases, is more likely to
dissent even when her disagreement with the majority is modest. This
is the case even though the practical costs of dissent, such as an
extended time commitment and strained collegial relationships, may
require that the disagreement at least be meaningful. Therefore,
individualistic judges will more frequently express their preferences
publicly as compared to institutionally oriented judges.
A judge's conception of the proper judicial role may affect the
frequency with which a judge votes his policy preferences-that is,
the magnitude of ideological adherence and the judge's willingness to
defer to colleagues and to precedent. The hypotheses below are
premised on this idea. In my own research on academics who become
appellate judges, I found that former professors take a more activist
and less accommodating approach to judging.89 They write more
often, dissent more often, and reverse more often than other judges.9"
Scholar jurists are more likely to adopt new theories and/or write
momentous opinions. 91 They appear to view their new posts as an
extension of their old ones: they propose innovative solutions to
existing problems and act independently rather than collaboratively.92
The next Section examines whether prior judicial experience has a
similar effect.
C. Prior Judicial Experience as a Predictor of Decisions and Actions
Based on the foregoing discussion on role conception and social
background theory, we should expect that a Justice's perception of
her role as a Justice will be heavily influenced by her prior judicial
89. George, supra note 12, at 37-50.
90. Id. at 50-54 & tbls.5, 6 & 7.
91. Id. at 54-59.
92. Id. at 37-59.
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experience. The change in employment from circuit judge to
Supreme Court Justice is in one sense minor: in both roles, judges
review the decisions of lower courts, hear oral arguments, negotiate
with colleagues to reach a collective decision, and issue written
decisions. There are numerous salient common characteristics that
grow out of the way the courts officially exercise their authority and
practically operate.
The U.S. Supreme Court and U.S. Courts of Appeals, with very
rare exceptions, make decisions as a group. Judges on both types of
courts, then, must learn how to work in this setting. I expect that
circuit judges elevated to the Supreme Court were particularly
successful at working with others. This experience likely is
manifested in several ways. First, courts of appeals judges, like
Supreme Court Justices, act collectively rather than individually.
Circuit judges, then, are accustomed to collegial decisionmaking,
whereas Justices from other legal occupations may be accustomed to
greater autonomy in their work. Second, because they can only
decide cases with the agreement of their colleagues, Justices and
circuit judges learn how to develop relationships with colleagues
within and across cases. Thus, the formation and maintenance of
coalitions is crucial to success as a federal appeals court judge.
Finally, circuit judges, like Supreme Court Justices, appreciate the
importance of accurately predicting their colleagues' positions on
pending cases and their receptivity to specific arguments.93
While Justices and circuit judges exercise judicial authority
collectively, they otherwise operate in relative isolation. During the
work day, they interact relatively infrequently with people beyond
their very small office staff of three or four clerks and one or two
secretaries. Lawyers in private practice, by contrast, often work in
large law firms with extensive support staff, and they also interact
regularly with clients, among others. Even district judges have more
regular daily contact with a wide range of people because their work
involves frequent interactions in their courtrooms or chambers with
counsel as well as the parties. Of course, all judges are prevented by
ethical rules from discussing pending matters with friends and family.
Moreover, it is difficult for visitors to even reach judicial chambers
because judges are hidden behind various layers of security. The
93. Rational actor theory has modeled the significance of these various internal
strategies on the Supreme Court, see, e.g., Paul J. Wahlbeck, James F. Spriggs & Forrest
Maltzman, Marshalling the Court: Bargaining and Accommodation on the United States
Supreme Court, 42 AM. J. POL. SCI. 294, 298-301 (1998), and courts of appeals, see, e.g.,
Cross & Tiller, supra note 76, at 2175-76.
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formality that surrounds judges also may limit normal interaction.
Elevated circuit judges likely have grown accustomed to the
cloistered existence of the appellate judge and have learned how to
work effectively in this environment.
I expect, then, that Justices who arrive from the circuit courts will
adapt more quickly and fully to life on the Supreme Court. And,
their work will reflect the ease and speed with which they settle into
their new chambers: they will write more opinions, and more
important ones, in their first year than Justices without such
experience; they will be more likely to take strong ideological
positions rather than the more moderate positions taken by new
Justices without circuit experience; and they generally will seem
comfortable where other new appointees seem bewildered or
disoriented by their new environs. In sum, we should see less of a
"freshman effect" in Justices promoted from the circuits. 94
While circuit judges and Justices may not regularly interact with
elected officials, they have to anticipate the position and likely
reaction of Congress and the President to their decisions, particularly
in the area of statutory interpretation.95 On the other hand, they need
not fear termination as reprisal because they are protected by life
tenure during good behavior. 96 Circuit judges, then, come to the
Supreme Court with a sophisticated appreciation of the relevance of
the elected branches of government to their decisions. We should
expect that Justices with circuit court experience will make decisions
that are as close as possible to their preferences without resulting in
reprisal from the other branches. That is, promoted Justices will
behave ideologically, but not beyond a point that prompts Congress
to overturn a statutory ruling or attempt to restrict a constitutional
one.
94. See, e.g., Timothy M. Hagle, "Freshman Effects" for Supreme Court Justices, 37
AM. J. POL. SC. 1142, 1143-44 (1993) (explaining the "freshman effect" as the period of
time required by newly appointed Justices to become acclimated to the Court). Hagle and
other scholars who have tested the freshman effect have not distinguished federal courts
of appeals experience from other judicial experience. And, as Hagle notes, the numbers
of Justices in some studies with circuit experience is so small as to make a systematic
empirical test infeasible. See id. at 1151.
95. See, e.g., Brian Sala & James F. Spriggs, II, Designing Tests of the Supreme Court
and the Separation of Powers, 57 POL. RES. Q. 197, 204-06 (2004); Jeffrey A. Segal,
Separation-of-Powers Games in the Positive Political Theory of the Courts, 91 AM. POL.
Sci. REV. 845, 845 (1996).
96. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. The Senate has impeached twelve judges and one
Justice. Seven judges were found guilty and removed from office. See United States
Senate, Impeachment, http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/
SenateImpeachmentRole.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2008).
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Perhaps most importantly, circuit judges work on a daily basis in
much the same way as Supreme Court Justices. They review briefs,
hear oral arguments, exchange written communications internally and
externally, and oversee judicial clerks. When deciding a case, their
options are to reverse or affirm a lower court or agency, and to join a
colleague's opinion or write separately. They consider precedent
when making decisions and justify any action based on existing law.
Moreover, a President's decision to nominate them and the Senate's
confirmation of that nomination likely reflect that the judge has
demonstrated real skill at justifying her decisions based on existing
law while also signaling her true preferences.
Given the numerous and substantial common features of both
positions, we might then expect that circuit judges experience little
"freshman" effect upon their elevation to the Court because their
work is similar to that in which they already have been engaged.97
But, in other relevant respects, the jobs are distinct. First, courts of
appeal operate primarily in rotating divisions of three judges that
include both active and senior circuit judges and visiting judges from
other courts.98 Circuit judges expect the identity of co-panelists to
vary across sessions. By contrast, Justices would sit with the same
group of colleagues for every Supreme Court decision until someone
left the Court. They may be more adept at coalition building and
compromise when working with the same group.
Second, circuit courts of appeals do not share the Supreme
Court's prerogative to select cases for review. Thus, most appeals
courts decisions involve routine examinations of lower court
outcomes, primarily using highly deferential standards of review, such
as abuse of discretion or plain error. Courts of appeals reverse only
about twenty percent of the cases, compared to a reversal rate of sixty
to sixty-five percent for the Supreme Court.99 As Justices, they hear
97. See VIRGINIA A. HETTINGER, STEFANIE A. LINDQUIST & WENDY L.
MARTINEK, JUDGING ON A COLLEGIAL COURT: INFLUENCES ON FEDERAL APPELLATE
DECISION MAKING 38-39 (2006).
98. Federal circuit judges who have retired from regular active service may ask to
serve on cases within their circuit. 28 U.S.C. § 294(b) (2000). The Judicial Code provides
that the chief judge of a circuit may assign senior and active district judges from within the
circuit to sit and decide cases brought before the circuit. Id. § 292(a). The code also
provides that the Chief Justice, at the request of the chief judge or circuit justice of a
circuit, may assign retired Supreme Court Justices with their consent, id. § 294(a), as well
as circuit judges from other circuits, id. § 291(a), to sit temporarily on the circuit. These
designated judges have the same authority as circuit judges in the cases in which they
participate. §§ 291(a), 294(a).
99. See Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary
Insights Into the "Affirmance Effect" on U.S. Courts of Appeals, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.
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more "hard" cases-those where there is a real dispute as to the
proper resolution of the question before the court. In Supreme Court
cases, law and precedent provide weak guidelines rather than
mandates. Thus, promoted Justices may view precedent as generally
irrelevant. By contrast, Justices appointed from the practicing bar,
for example, will not be as attuned to this distinction.
Third, circuit judges lack the final word on the law even if
Supreme Court review of their decisions is unlikely. They should
view the Supreme Court's power as substantial because they have
toiled in its shadow. Thus, they may be eager to exercise their new
authority as Supreme Court Justices. And, unlike practitioners who
value stability and certainty of law, judges may feel less constrained
since they have not most recently worked under it.
Fourth, circuit judges have a much heavier workload than do
Justices. We should expect them to move more quickly and handle
more cases. They also have more time to write separately once
elevated to the Supreme Court than they had on the court of appeals.
Moving away from courts in which a large and mandatory docket
limits the desirability of dissent, promoted Justices should appreciate
their newfound freedom to disagree and draft opinions giving
reasons.
Fifth, Supreme Court Justices who were circuit judges are more
likely to think courts of appeals decided cases correctly and thus to
affirm lower courts more often and/or grant certiorari in fewer cases.
Justices generally agree to hear cases with which they disagree"°°: if
they assume lower courts reached the right outcome, they have no
reason to grant certiorari. In particular, they seem likely to believe
that their own former circuit got it right and to cite and support their
former court when possible. Jeffrey Berger and I found that Justices
are more likely to cite opinions of judges from their old circuit.'' Of
course, circuit courts do not always agree, resulting in circuit splits.
Such inter-circuit conflicts likely appear more important as a general
357, 359-63 (2005) (presenting graphically data on circuit court and Supreme Court
affirmance rates from 1946-2003 separately (Figures 1 and 2) and together (Figure 3) and
describing the rates of affirmance based on the nature of the decision).
100. See Robert L. Boucher, Jr. & Jeffrey A. Segal, Supreme Court Justices as Strategic
Decision Makers: Aggressive Grants and Defensive Denials on the Vinson Court, 57 J.
POL. 824, 829-35 (1995).
101. See Jeffrey A. Berger & Tracey E. George, Judicial Entrepreneurs on the U.S.
Courts of Appeals: A Citation Analysis of Judicial Influence 18 (Vand. U. Law Sch. Law
and Econ., Working Paper No. 05-24, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=789544.
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matter to former circuit judges. Thus, they should be more likely to
grant certiorari to circuit splits."°
Finally, circuit judges' experiences are inevitably tied to their
respective circuits. The D.C. Circuit now has a plurality of the
Justices. That circuit is both combative and constrained in subject
matter."3 By contrast, the First Circuit is a small court that operates
with a high level of harmony, as reflected in a very high level of
consensus and infrequent en banc hearings.'1°
The foregoing analysis supports specific predictions about the
effects of prior federal judicial service on Supreme Court Justices. I
offer the following hypotheses about the relationship between circuit
court experience and Supreme Court behavior:
102. Supreme Court Rule 10 includes as a compelling reason to grant a petition that "a
United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the decision of
another United States court of appeals on the same important matter" or "that conflicts
with a decision by a state court of last resort." SUP. CT. R. 10(a).
103. Personal jurisdiction and venue essentially dictate the subject matter jurisdiction
of the D.C. Circuit. On the one hand, nearly all administrative law suits may be brought in
the D.C. District Court. Under the federal venue statute, civil suits against the U.S.
government that challenge federal regulations may be brought in a federal district in
which the government defendant resides (usually Washington, D.C.), "a substantial part of
the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred" (again, usually Washington,
D.C.), or where the plaintiff resides. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e) (2000). On the other hand, the
small geographic size of the District of Columbia means that relatively few organizations
and individuals reside there, limiting the district court's personal jurisdiction as well as its
venue. For a further discussion, see, for example, Susan Low Bloch & Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Celebrating the 200th Anniversary of the Federal Courts of the District of
Columbia, 90 GEO. L.J. 549, 564-605 (2002) (examining the workload of the federal courts
in D.C. and concluding that its primary role is to monitor and check the power of the
federal government); Harold H. Bruff, Coordinating Judicial Review in Administrative
Law, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1201-02 (1992) (explaining that their location in the U.S.
capital means that the district and circuit courts in the D.C. Circuit hear a disproportionate
number of administrative law disputes even in instances where venue is not restricted to
the District of Columbia); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the
D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1717, 1738-47, 1759-64 (1997) (explaining that "the
D.C. Circuit has exclusive venue over challenges to a wide array of environmental
regulations" and finding that, in environmental cases, D.C. Circuit judges behaved
ideologically); and John G. Roberts, Jr., What Makes the D.C. Circuit Different? A
Historical View, 92 VA. L. REV. 375, 376-77 (2006) (explaining how the circuit's small
geographic size coupled with its location in the capital translates into a docket dominated
by civil cases involving the federal government).
104. Over the last decade, the First Circuit averaged only two en banc decisions per
year. See Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Judicial Business of the United States
Courts, Annual Reports for 1997-2007 tbl.S-1, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
judbususc/judbus.html. For a consideration of the collegiality of the First Circuit, see, for
example, FRANK M. COFFIN, ON APPEAL: COURTS, LAWYERING, AND JUDGING 213-20
(1994) (arguing that collegiality is crucial to judicial decisionmaking and explaining how
First Circuit judges work together to reach consensus); and Goldman, supra note 13, at
495 (finding that every circuit but the First Circuit had clear ideological voting blocs).
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Hypothesis 1. Promoted Justices will experience little freshman
effect.
Hypothesis 2. Promoted Justices will be more likely to find
statutes unconstitutional.
Hypothesis 3. Promoted Justices will be more likely to
overturn or at least to distinguish precedent.
Hypothesis 4. Promoted Justices will author more opinions
generally and in particular as a product of a decision to concur
and/or dissent.
Hypothesis 5. Promoted Justices will develop long-lasting
coalitions.
Hypothesis 6. Promoted Justices will show greater support,
through affirmation and citation, for their former circuit than
for other circuits.
Hypothesis 7. Promoted Justices will bring the norms of their
respective circuits to the High Court.
Most, though not all, of these forecasts are sensitive to time.
That is, Justices who served for longer periods on a circuit court will
be more likely to manifest this behavior (or to show a stronger
version of it) than Justices who served for shorter periods.
Intervening years and experiences likely dampen the effects of circuit
court service. But, even those later events will be framed by the
Justice's earlier work on the courts of appeals. Hence, the prior
judicial experience will continue to influence, at least indirectly, a
Justice's actions indefinitely.
CONCLUSION
The Roberts Court has been described as deeply divided and
ideologically polarized. l" This account is consistent with the judicial
background hypotheses developed here. Promoted Justices are more
likely to build coalitions (Hypothesis 5) and also to express publicly
any disagreement that they have with other Justices (Hypothesis 6).
Such behavior naturally will lead to divisions within the Court. With
respect to these (and the other) hypotheses, I would anticipate that
105. See Barnes, supra note 2.
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the homogeneity of the Justices would magnify the hypothesized
effect.
The two most recent appointees, Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito, offer a prime example. Both have acclimated fairly
quickly to the dynamics of the Court, as predicted by the first
hypothesis. They already have influenced the outcome in several
important and hotly contested cases. During the 2006 Term, they
formed a powerful five-Justice majority with Justices Scalia, Kennedy,
and Thomas in fourteen of the twenty-five cases decided five-to-
four.116 "It is not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed
so much," warned Justice Breyer."°  This new coalition upheld a
partial-birth abortion ban in a seeming about-face from a 2000
decision, struck down school racial integration plans, protected faith-
based initiatives from taxpayer suits, and limited a 1969 case
protecting student speech.1 8
In its first Term, the Roberts 2 Court decided more than one-
third of its cases by a one-vote margin.0 9 Chief Justice Roberts and
Justice Alito were in the majority in more than three-quarters of
those five-to-four decisions." ' In cases where they disagreed with the
majority, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito both demonstrated a
willingness to write separately."'
These close cases also reveal that the Roberts 2 Court has not
deferred to prior Courts (Hypothesis 3). In fewer than sixty cases in
its first Term, the new Court undercut numerous Supreme Court
decisions including several landmark opinions.112 The Court rarely
106. The Supreme Court-The Statistics, 121 HARv. L. REV. 436, 442 tbl.I(E) (2007)
(listing all majority coalitions in five-to-four decisions).
107. Justice Breyer issued this warning in his oral dissent in Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 151 U.S. _, 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007).
108. See supra notes 5, 7-9 and accompanying text (presenting details on the cases).
109. See The Supreme Court-The Statistics, supra note 106, at 442 tbl.I(E).
110. Id. Only Justice Kennedy, who was in the majority in all of those cases and is
widely recognized as the Court's swing vote, was in the majority more often. See id. at 442
tbl.I(E) & n.s (observing this fact).
111. Both were nearly as likely to write a dissent as to join one when they were not in
the majority. Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion in three of the eight cases in which he
disagreed with the outcome, and Alito wrote a dissenting opinion in four of the nine cases
in which he disagreed. See id. at 436 tbl.I(A). And, Alito wrote a concurrence in all four
cases in which he concurred in the judgment but not the Court's opinion. See id. at 436
tbl.I(A), 441 tbl.I(D).
112. See, e.g., Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2622 (2007) (creating an
exception to the principle of Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969), that students do not "shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate"); Bell Atd. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.., - 127 S.
Ct. 1955 (2007) (appearing to call into doubt notice pleading, a central feature of the
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overturns (rather than distinguishes) its prior decisions because "the
doctrine of stare decisis is of fundamental importance to the rule of
law."'1 13  The new Court, however, quickly overturned three cases
during a Term when it decided far fewer cases than average." 4 This
type of behavior is often described as activist because the Justices are
setting aside the normal restriction on judicial decisionmaking while
extending the authority of the current Court.
In the first Part of this Article, I predict that Presidents will
continue to look to the circuit courts for Supreme Court nominees.
With one Justice in his 80s and four Justices in their 70s,115 the next
President is likely to name at least one member of the Court. We will
have to wait to see whether his or her advisors will recommend
continuing the trend.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that has been reaffirmed in numerous decisions including
the landmark case of Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957), abrogated by Twombly, 550
U.S. at __ 127 S. Ct. at 1969, and the more recent Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S.
506 (2002)).
113. Welch v. Tex. Dep't. of Highways & Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 494 (1987).
114. See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc. 551 U.S. -, 127 S. Ct.
2705 (2007) (overruling, by a five-to-four vote, Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park &
Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911), which provided that resale price maintenance agreements
were per se illegal under Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act).
115. Justice Stevens celebrated his 88th birthday on April 20 of this year. See Oyez
U.S. Supreme Court Media, John Paul Stevens, http://www.oyez.org/justices/
john-paul stevens/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2008). Justice Ginsburg, thirteen years his junior,
is the next oldest Justice. See id., Ruth Bader Ginsburg, http://www.oyez.org/justices/
ruthbader-ginsburg/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2008) (reporting Ginsburg's date of birth as
March 15, 1933). Justices Scalia and Kennedy are both seventy-two this year. See id. at
Antonin Scalia, http://www.oyez.org/justices/antonin-scalia/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2008)
(reporting Scalia's birthday as March 11, 1936); id. at Anthony M. Kennedy,
http://www.oyez.org/justices/anthony-kennedy/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2008) (reporting
Kennedy's birthday as July 23, 1936).
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APPENDIX
Table 1A. Justices with Prior Article III Judicial Experience, 1900 to 2007116
Justice
Samuel Alito
Harry Blackmun
Stephen Breyer
Warren Burger
John Clarke
William Day
Ruth Bader
Ginsburg
John Marshall
Harlan
Anthony Kennedy
Horace Lurton
Thu'rgood Marshall
Sherman Minton
John Roberts
Wiley Rutledge
Edward Sanford
Antonin Scalia
David Souter
John Stevens
Potter Stewart
William Taft
Clarence Thomas
Lower Court
Third Circuit
Eighth Circuit
First Circuit
D.C. Circuit
N.D. Ohio
Sixth Circuit
D.C. Circuit
Lower Court
Service
(in years)
15.77
10.72
13.65
13.24
2.01
3.98
13.15
Second Circuit 1.12
Ninth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Second Circuit
Sixth Circuit
D.C. Circuit
D.C. Circuit
M.D. & E.D.
Tenn.
D.C. Circuit
First Circuit
Seventh Circuit
Sixth Circuit
Sixth Circuit
D.C. Circuit
12.91
16.73
2.94
8.39
2.33
3.79
14.73
4.11
0.44
5.18
4.47
8.00
1.62
116. For sources, see citations supra note 15.
President (Year) of
Supreme Court
Appointment
George W. Bush (2006)
Richard Nixon (1970)
William Clinton (1994)
Richard Nixon (1969)
Woodrow Wilson (1916)
Theodore Roosevelt (1903)
William Clinton (1993)
Dwight Eisenhower (1955)
Ronald Reagan (1988)
William Taft (1909)
Lyndon Johnson (1967)
Harry Truman (1949)
George W. Bush (2005)
Franklin Roosevelt (1943)
Warren Harding (1923)
Ronald Reagan (1986)
George H.W. Bush (1990)
Gerald Ford (1975)
Dwight Eisenhower (1959)
Warren Harding (1921)
George H. W. Bush (1991)
[Vol. 861366
HeinOnline  -- 86 N.C. L. Rev. 1366 2007-2008
FROM JUDGE TO JUSTICE
Willis Van Devanter Eighth Circuit
Frederick Vinson D.C. Circuit
Charles Whittaker W.D. Mo.
Eighth Circuit
7.83
5.45
1.96
0.76
William Taft (1910)
Harry Truman (1946)
Dwight Eisenhower (1957)
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